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Abstract
This article provides a review on the theories of various power-law phenomena
related to geography and trade. In particular, we focus our discussion on the gravity
equation of trade flows, the power law in firm size, and the link between the two
— highlighting the roles of geography and trade in the theoretical modeling. We
also discuss how these two power-law phenomena may be related to other power-law
phenomena, such as those in income, firm productivity and city size.
1 Introduction
This articles reviews inter-related power-law phenomena in geography and trade. Given the
empirical evidence on the gravity equation in trade flows across countries and regions, we
review its theoretical underpinnings. The gravity equation amounts to saying that trade
flows follow a power law in distance (or geographic barriers). We conclude that in the
environment with firm heterogeneity, the power law in firm size is the key condition for the
gravity equation to arise. We then review the literature that provides the microfoundation
for the power law in firm size, and review how this power law (in firm size) may be related
to the power laws in other distributions (in incomes, firm productivity and city size).
Both gravity equation and power law in firm size are well documented empirical regular-
ities (see Head and Mayer, 2015; Axtell, 2001; Luttmer, 2007; Gabaix, 2009). Because of its
seemingly universal applicability, the power-law phenomenon that characterizes trade flows,
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incomes, firm and city sizes, and network linkages was dubbed by Krugman (1997) as social
physics. The work by Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) further highlights
that the power coefficient in the gravity equation, i.e., the partial elasticity of trade with
respect to variable trade cost, is one of the two sufficient statistics to impute a country’s
welfare gains from trade for a large set of trade models. As mentioned, the power law in
firm size is a key condition for the gravity equation in aggregate trade flows. Moreover,
the heavy tail implication of the power law is also consistent with the granular economies
phenomenon (Gabaix, 2011); i.e., the few very large firms may be what matters the most for
macroeconomic performance. Thus, it is important to understand the plausible explanations
for this power law in firm size to arise and how it is connected with other power laws.
For an extensive review of the literature on the gravity equation, see Head and Mayer
(2015). This survey draws insights from Head and Mayer (2015) and extends the review
to recent developments in theoretical trade modeling. We focus on identifying the critical
conditions that lead to a gravity equation in aggregate trade flows, and discuss the gen-
eral applicability of the gravity equation in these alternative models of supply/demand side
structures. For an extensive review of power-law phenomena in economics and finance, see
Gabaix (2009). Our survey differs from Gabaix (2009) by including recent theoretical expla-
nations for the power law in firm size that do not resort to firm dynamics. In particular, we
discuss theories whereby power laws emerge in static environments, due to firm hierarchy,
networks, innovation, or geography.
2 Trade and Power-law Phenomena
2.1 Gravity Equation
Since the 1960s, international trade flows (Tinbergen, 1962) have been documented to follow
the law of gravity, where the volume of trade increases with the economic size of the trading
partners and decreases with their distance:
Xij ∝ YiEj
(Distanceij)ζ
(1)
with Xij denoting the exports from country i to country j, and Yi and Ej the gross output
and expenditure of the exporting and importing country, respectively. The distance term
is typically interpreted as capturing all trade cost τij created by geographical distance as
well as cultural, institutional and policy barriers (such as similarity in language, religion,
legal origin, colonial history, regional trade agreements, currency union, and membership
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in GATT/WTO). The empirical evidence on the gravity equation is not only abundant for
international trade, but also regional trade (e.g., Duranton, Morrow and Turner, 2014; Monte,
Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, forthcoming; McCallum, 1995; Anderson and van Wincoop,
2003).
The empirical specification, initially thought to be an ad hoc invention until the early
2000, has subsequently been found to be consistent with almost all canonical trade models.
These include: (i) Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) — with perfect competition and
Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preference for goods differentiated by
countries of origin; (ii) Eaton and Kortum (2002) — with the Ricardian structure and CES
preferences where countries’ productivity (z) for producing each good is characterized by an
i.i.d. Fre´chet distribution: Fi(z) = e
−Tiz−κ , κ > 1, Ti > 0; (iii) Krugman (1980) — with
monopolistic competition and CES preference; and (iv) Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008)
— with the Krugman structure along with firm heterogeneity in productivity, characterized
by a Pareto distribution: Gi(z) = 1 − z−κ, κ > 1. By closing these models with goods
market-clearing conditions (as first suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), they
generally imply a structural gravity equation,
Xij ∝ YiEj
(
τij
Πi Pj
)−ζ
(2)
(Πi)
−ζ =
N∑
j=1
(
τij
Pj
)−ζ
Ej for i = 1, . . . , N (3)
(Pj)
−ζ =
N∑
i=1
(
τij
Πi
)−ζ
Yi for j = 1, . . . , N (4)
where Πi can be regarded as country i’s multilateral outward resistance to exports, as it
is an average of country i’s bilateral trade cost τij to reach each destination market j (rel-
ative to market j’s overall resistance to imports, Pj), weighted by destination market size
Ej. Similarly, Pj can be regarded as country j’s multilateral inward resistance to imports.
The structural gravity equation in (2) extends equation (1) by down-weighting the absolute
bilateral trade cost with these two multilateral resistance (MR) terms, and linking these MR
terms and bilateral trade costs across countries by the structural conditions (3)–(4). See
Head and Mayer (2015) for a detailed synthesis of this literature.
Interestingly, the gravity specification is robust to several generalizations of the above
literature. For example, Bernard et al. (2003) generalize Eaton and Kortum (2002) by
adopting Bertrand competition (instead of perfect competition). This leads to variable
markups but nonetheless the same expression for aggregate bilateral trade (under a Fre´chet-
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like productivity distributional assumption). Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) extend Melitz
(2003) by adopting linear demand (instead of CES) for differentiated varieties. The model
is also able to accommodate variable markups, and although the implied bilateral trade flow
departs from the structural gravity equation (2), it follows a generalized gravity equation:
Xij ∝
(
τ−ζij
Ωi Ξj
)
(5)
where Ωi and Ξj are exporter and importer-specific deep parameters (not limited to gross
outputs and aggregate expenditures).
Most importantly, the trade cost factor τij in the above literature often enters the grav-
ity equation by a decreasing power function, where the power ζ corresponds to either the
demand-side parameter (the degree of the elasticity of substitution across goods, σ, net of 1)
or the supply-side parameter (the inverse dispersion measure of the productivity distribution
κ). Strictly speaking, the Melitz-type model implies a gravity equation that depends not
only on variable trade cost τij but also fixed trade cost fij, and inclusive of both the extensive
margin (the mass of firms that export to a destination weighted by market share) and the
intensive margin of trade (the volume of trade at firm level). Nonetheless, both margins
ultimately depend on variable and fixed trade costs by a power law (with different power
functions) under a Pareto distribution for firm size, as formally shown by Chaney (2008).
The power ζ for the trade cost factor also corresponds to the (partial) trade elasticity,
which has attracted much attention in recent quantitative trade models. As first suggested
by Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) (ACR), under certain restrictions, the
trade elasticity and changes in domestic trade share (an inverse measure of trade openness)
are sufficient statistics of a country’s welfare gain from trade (or more generally, a country’s
welfare change across two levels of trade openness), regardless of the underlying trade models:
Ŵ =
(
λ̂
)−1/ζ
(6)
where Ŵ ≡ W ′/W indicates the change in real income and λ̂ ≡ λ′/λ the change in domestic
trade share (e.g., λj = Xjj/Ej). Equation (6) holds in most of the canonical trade models
we mentioned above that generate a gravity equation. Thus, there is a close link between
the gravity equation and the generality of the ACR welfare formula. Once the condition of
constant trade elasticity fails, the simple welfare-change formula of ACR in (6) also breaks
down. Thus, whether the power law holds globally (across all levels of trade cost and
openness) in the gravity equation is a necessary condition for using the ACR formula in (6)
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for quantitative welfare evaluation.1
In the remainder of this section, we review recent trade models that bear on the gravity
equation, with special focus on the underlying modeling assumptions that imply a power-law
phenomenon in trade flows.
2.2 Network, Geography, and Gravity
In the canonical model of Chaney (2008), bilateral trade flows are a power function in variable
trade cost τ−ζij under the Melitz structure with Pareto productivity distribution, where the
power ζ equals exactly the inverse dispersion parameter of the productivity distribution κ.
Thus, a power law in firm size implies a power law in aggregate bilateral trade flows under
the Melitz setup with CES preferences.
Chaney (2018) instead starts with a general setup without regard to the preferences and
proposes three sufficient conditions under which the distance elasticity of trade is constant
(at least for long distances). This requires more than a Pareto distribution for firm size (with
shape parameter κ), but also a line-up of firm size and the distance of firms’ exports such
that the average squared distance of exports is an increasing power function of firm size (with
a power µ > 0) and that κ < 1 + µ (such that the right tail of firm size is sufficiently thick
and trade over long distance is dominated by exports of large firms). When these conditions
hold, the distance elasticity tends toward ζ = 1 + 2(κ− 1)/µ. Thus, if the firm size follows
approximately Zipf’s law (κ = 1), the distance elasticity is also approximately equal to one.
Chaney (2018) documents that these sufficient conditions indeed hold for French firm-level
data, and the distance elasticity ζ for aggregate trade is not statistically different from that
predicted by the theory: 1 + 2(κ− 1)/µ.
Chaney (2018) then micro-founds the first two conditions by a network theory of firm-
to-firm trade, where a firm grows bigger as its network of contacts grows along a real line
(with the new contacts arriving at a constant rate through its existing network of contacts),
and as a result, exports to contacts that are further away. Firm size is measured by the
number of contacts that a firm has. Since firms are born at a constant rate and establish
new contacts at a constant rate (among their cohorts), firm size corresponds to firm age,
1In the case of variable trade elasticity, the local welfare change formula of ACR may still be used:
d lnW (τ) = − 1
ζ(τ)
d lnλ(τ).
For example, the local formula holds in Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2015) and Feenstra and Weinstein
(2017). Conceptually, one needs to obtain the elasticity at different levels of trade cost, and integrate the
right-hand side of the above equation over the relevant interval of trade cost, to derive the discrete change
in welfare.
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and the fraction of firms above a certain age (and size) is, as a result, a power function (in
Section 3, we discuss further the mechanism under which the above assumptions give rise
to the power law in firm size). He then uses partial differential equations to characterize
how the probability density function of a firm’s contacts (indexed by their distance from the
firm) evolves over time to calculate the second moment of the distance distribution. Using
Fourier-transform techniques to convert the density function into scalars, and the properties
of convolution products, he shows that it is indeed an increasing power function in firm age
(size).
This paper thus provides a network micro-foundation for a power-law phenomenon in
the firm size distribution, the average squared distance of firm-level exports, and in the
geography distribution of aggregate trade flows.
2.3 Endogenous Market Access Cost
The Melitz-Chaney model with fixed export cost and CES preferences implies a uniform
elasticity of substitution between varieties, and hence (i) a power law distribution of firm
export sales, and (ii) equal growth rates of trade (in response to trade cost reduction) for all
previously traded goods. Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) demonstrate — using French
firm-level data on exports to each destination market — that firm export sales approach
Pareto distribution only at the tail of the largest firms. Meanwhile, Arkolakis (2010) shows
that during the NAFTA liberalization episode in the 1990s, the growth rate of trade is larger
if the initial sales of goods are lower — using data on disaggregated product categories. Both
papers reconcile the first stylized fact by allowing for endogenous market access cost (instead
of fixed export cost). The market access cost to reach each additional consumer increases
(i.e., it is an increasing convex function in the total number of consumers reached). As a
result, relatively unproductive firms choose to reach only a few consumers in a given market.
More productive firms sell more in a market at the conventional intensive margin (sales per
consumer) but also at the new consumer margin (they endogenously choose to reach more
consumers):
rij(z) ≡ pij(z)qij(z)
=
 σ
Lαj w
1−γ
i w
γ
j
ψ
(
z
z∗ij
)σ−1 [
1−
(
z∗ij
z
)(σ−1)/β]
if z ≥ z∗ij
0 otherwise
(7)
where rij(z) is the export sales of a firm with productivity level z, Lj is the destination market
size, wi and wj are wage levels in country i and j, respectively, z
∗
ij is the productivity cutoff
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to enter market j for firms from country i, and (α, β, ψ) are parameters in the marketing
technology function. For example, a higher β implies a higher degree of convexity in the
marketing cost function. When β = 0, the costs to reach additional consumers remain
constant and the setup becomes observationally equivalent to the case of fixed export cost.
For positive β, by (7), export sales approach the Pareto distribution only at the upper tail
(where the intensive margin dominates the new consumer margin for firms of sufficiently high
productivities), while the export sales toward the lower tail are increasingly less than what
is predicted by Melitz-type models with fixed export cost. These observations are consistent
with the sales distribution of French firms in foreign markets documented by Eaton, Kortum
and Kramarz (2011).
Given this structure, Arkolakis (2010) further demonstrates that the partial elasticity of
firm-level trade rij(z) with respect to a change in τij is decreasing in firm productivity levels
and approaches that of the Melitz-type model (σ − 1) as z tends to infinity:
ζ(z) = (σ − 1) + σ − 1
β
[(
z
z∗ij
)(σ−1)/β]−1
(8)
Thus, trade cost changes have proportionally bigger impacts on the smaller exporters in a
given market.
Interestingly, even though trade elasticity at the firm-level is not constant, the paper
shows that to a first-order approximation, the aggregate trade flows, Xij/Xjj, are still de-
scribed by a power-law function in the variable trade cost τij with ζ = κ (taking into account
the intensive margin, the new consumer margin, and the new firm margin), consistent with
Chaney (2008). This set of papers thus provides theoretical support for the hypothesis that
aggregate trade flows can be approximated reasonably well by a power law, regardless of the
micro-structures for firm-level trade, so long as the firm size follows a power law.
2.4 Non-Homothetic Preferences
The above literatures leave the impression that variations in the supply-side micro-structures
do not substantively invalidate the power-law phenomenon of aggregate trade flows. The
work of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) also suggests that variable markups and non-homothetic
preferences may leave this conclusion intact as well. The work of Arkolakis et al. (forthcom-
ing) (ACDR) confirms that this is indeed the case, even in environments with non-CES
homothetic preferences, or with non-homothetic (but directly additive) preferences. Berto-
letti, Etro and Simonovska (2018) (BES) further show that a setup with indirectly additive
preferences (indirect utility functions that are additive in prices), but with the supply-side
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structure of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), will arrive at a gravity equation that observes the
power law as well (with ζ = κ, the shape parameter of the Pareto productivity distribu-
tion). Thus, in sum, whether the preferences are CES (as in ACR), non-CES homothetic or
directly-additive non-homothetic (as in ACDR), or indirectly-additive non-homothetic (as
in BES), so long as the firm productivity follows a power law (i.e. Pareto distribution), the
normalized aggregate trade flows (Xij/Xjj) are still expressed by a power function in τij.
However, an important point highlighted by Arkolakis et al. (forthcoming) and Bertoletti
et al. (2018) is that even if the partial trade elasticity of trade cost is constant, which can in
principle be estimated using the gravity equation, the welfare implications are not equivalent
across ACR, ACDR-non-homothetic, and BES-non-homothetic. In particular,
d lnWACRj =
−d lnλjj
κ
(9)
d lnWACDR−nhomoj =
(
1− ρ
κ+1
) −d lnλjj
κ
(10)
d lnWBES−nhomoj = 
c −d lnλjj
κ
(11)
where ρ is a sales-weighted average of the elasticity of markups to productivity. For example,
it is zero under constant markups as in ACR, and positive in Krugman (1979) and Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008). Since in models with non-homothetic preferences, the elasticity of
markups to productivity lies in the unit interval, ρ ∈ (0, 1), the welfare gain is smaller under
ACDR non-homothetic preferences than ACR.2 Since
(
1− ρ
κ+1
) ∈ ( κ
κ+1
, 1), a more dispersed
firm size distribution (smaller κ) implies a potentially larger deviation.
Meanwhile, c represents the average pass-through (of cost changes to prices). When
pass-through is high and approaches unity as in the case of ACR, the welfare implications
are similar between BES and ACR. In general, however, it is likely that the welfare gains
from trade liberalization are lower under BES non-homothetic preferences, given incomplete
pass-through in the BES environment. The less elastic the demand (and the lower the
pass-through) is, the larger will be the downward revision.
2.5 Summary
In sum, the power law in aggregate bilateral trade flows turns out to be a robust theoretical
regularity, as it holds under various perturbations to the supply-side and demand-side struc-
tures. The critical condition to guarantee this generality appears to be a power law in firm
size, as shown by Melitz and Redding (2015), Chaney (2018), and Arkolakis et al. (forth-
2Nevertheless, in the ACDR class, trade flows and trade elasticity remain sufficient statistics for welfare
gains from trade, as in ACR.
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coming). However, note that even if this class of models all imply a power-law phenomenon
in the aggregate trade flows (i.e., constant trade elasticity), they do not necessarily imply
the same welfare effects when trade cost changes, whose nature is sensitive to the preference
specifications. Thus, the empirical and theoretical validity of the gravity equation is not a
sufficient condition for welfare equivalence across trade models.
3 Micro-foundation for Power Law in Firm Size
The above survey demonstrates the instrumental role of power law in firm size in gener-
ating the power-law phenomena in trade flows (gravity equation). It is thus important to
understand the theoretical underpinnings of power laws in firm size. This section reviews
the recent literature on this topic. Readers are referred to Gabaix (2009) for an extensive
survey of the earlier literature. Here we highlight the connections of recent explanations for
the power law in firm size with geography and trade, whenever appropriate.
3.1 Firm Dynamics
The classic explanation for the power law in firm size, or sometimes more specifically, Zipf’s
law (a power law with a tail index of 1), is developed from the perspective of firm dynamics.
It has a long tradition dating back to Gibrat (1931), who asserted that the rate of growth
of firm size is independent of size. That is, the growth rate of firms of different size, as a
random variable, follows the same distribution. Such a mathematical statement, dubbed
Gibrat’s law of the growth of firm sizes, can be translated into geometric Brownian motion:
dxt = αxtdt+ σxtdzt, (12)
where xt is the firm size, zt is a Brownian motion without drift, and α and σ are constants.
Denote a Brownian motion with drift as dx˜t = αdt+σdzt. Then, the change of the Brownian
motion is normally distributed by applying the central limit theorem to the random-walk
representation with infinitesimal steps dzt. Because d lnxt = dxt/xt, changes in lnxt over a
finite time interval T follow a normal distribution. In other words, changes in xt in a finite
time interval T follow a log-normal distribution with mean
(
α− 1
2
σ2
)
T and variance σ2T .
An immediate implication is that the limiting distribution of xt when T goes to infinity
does not exist. Nonetheless, if there is a reflection barrier for xt as a lower bound, then the
limiting distribution for xt exists and is given by a power law.
3 For a concise exposition of the
3A reflection barrier x is a lower bound such that xt will remain where it is at time t if it encounters a
negative shock that would move it below x without any interference.
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above, see Chapter 3 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Because Brownian motion is essentially
the continuous version of a random walk with infinitesimal steps, there are also discrete
processes (e.g., the Kesten process) that generate power laws in a similar fashion.
It is well known that the power law also holds for city size distribution with a tail index
near one.4 Gabaix (1999) identifies the condition under which Zipf’s law for city size emerges,
and he shows this with both a Brownian motion and a Kesten process and embeds these
into a simple urban model. For the firm size distribution, Luttmer (2007) was the first to
derive Zipf’s law in a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics, in contrast to the previous
literature that focused on probability processes that led to a power (or Zipf’s) law. See, for
example, Simon and Bonini (1958), Steindl (1965), and Ijiri and Simon (1964).
In Luttmer (2007), there are shocks to both demand and productivity, and if both shocks
are assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion, then firm size also follows geometric
Brownian motion. Here, the shock to demand can be interpreted as changes in “quality”.
His economic mechanism features firm entry, exit by selection, and firm growth. Incumbent
firms need to pay a fixed cost to keep operating, and when some incumbent firms’ quality
augmented productivity falls too low, they exit. Entrant firms can imitate the incumbents
by randomly sampling an incumbent and obtaining the scaled down productivity of this
incumbent (hence it is an imperfect imitation). As both types of firms grow at a similar
rate, there exists a balanced growth path in which both types of firms exist. There is
a “return process” in the model that plays the role of a reflection barrier. The “return
process” exists because firms exit when their quality augmented productivity is below some
barrier and enter at a point above this barrier. The stationary firm size distribution on the
balanced growth path is a gamma distribution with a power law right tail, where the tail
index depends on the parameters of the model. He shows that when the entry costs are high
or that imitation is difficult, the resulting tail index is close to one (his data indicate a tail
index of 1.06 for the US firm size distribution), and this seems to be consistent with the fact
that US entrant sizes are typically small.
The intuition for his result is as follows. Note first that when a power law approaches
Zipf’s law, the mean firm size grows without bound. Then, because firm profitability is
tied to size, the fact that entrants attempt to imitate a randomly sampled incumbent ties
4Eeckhout (2004) argues that the log-normal distribution is a better description for the “entire” distri-
bution of human settlements (not just cities). There is an ensuing debate about this. As Eeckhout (2004)
uses the U.S. census places as cities (human settlements), it is unclear why census places are good proxies
for cities. Rozenfeld et al. (2011) instead use an algorithm to identify population clusters in the US with
population data of fine resolution (census tracts) and argue that Zipf’s law still better describes the distri-
bution of the population cluster of more than 10,000 people. Regardless of the debate, the consensus of the
literature is that the right tail of the city size distribution is well approximated by a power law, whereas the
entire distribution might be something else.
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the expected gains from entry to the average size of incumbents. In equilibrium, entry
cost must be high so that it can compensate the high expected gains that reflect the large
firm size of top firms (fat tails!). All of these are relative to the continuation cost for the
incumbent firms (fixed cost). In short, this paper specifies clearly in economics what it takes
in a model of firm dynamics to entail a distribution with very large mean that is consistent
with a power-law generating process, that is, geometric Brownian motion. Later, Luttmer
(2012) considers different imitation mechanisms, and shows that Zipf’s law still holds in a
mechanism where entrants can make only small improvements over the technologies used
by the least productive incumbents. This echoes Luttmer’s (2007) condition that entry or
imitation is difficult, but under this alternative mechanism both entry and exit rates are
high, as observed in the data. For other economic models of firm dynamics based on the
random growth mechanism, see also Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) and Acemoglu and
Cao (2015).
The literature that explains the power or Zipf’s law using firm dynamics is appealing in
its economic mechanism and its generality in the sense that it can potentially be extended
to the power-law phenomena in other objects or fields. Nevertheless, this approach relies
strongly on Gibrat’s law, whose validity is not without a question (see, for example, Stanley
et al., 1996; Rossi-Hansberg and Wright, 2007).5 From the perspective of this article, if power
law in firm size leads to a gravity equation in international and regional trade flows, we might
expect it to be related to geography and trade as well. Few studies in the firm-dynamics
literature incorporate trade and geography. In addition, we might also expect the power
law in firm size to be related to that in city size, as cities are made of firms and also firms’
major markets. Finally, we might also expect the power law in firm size to be related to
that in income, which is also a documented empirical regularity. The following sub-sections
review recent developments in the literature that incorporate these different angles without
resorting to Gibrat’s law.
3.2 Static Explanations: Networks, Firm Hierarchy, and Innova-
tion
3.2.1 Trade Networks
The degree distribution of a network is known to exhibit a power law. If links among nodes
are formed randomly with each pair of nodes having the same probability of linking, such a
5There is a similar doubt about the validity of Gibrat’s law for city growth. See, for example, Redding
and Sturm (2008) and Desmet and Rappaport (2017). In particular, Redding and Sturm (2008) show that
a city’s growth rate depends on its “market potential”, which in turn depends on nearby cities’ sizes and
growth. Hence, the growth rates of cities are not independently and identically distributed.
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random graph does not entail a power law. A “scale-free network” is one type of graph in
which the probabilities of forming links are proportional to the degrees (sizes) of the nodes.
This process of link formation is also known as preferential attachment. See, for example,
Baraba´si and Albert (1999). In some sense, this is similar to random growth because under
preferential attachment, the bigger nodes have similar growth rates in degrees to the smaller
nodes as the process goes on. In the economics literature, Chaney (2014) is a prominent
example who applied preferential attachment to explain the power law in firm size and
explain how this is linked to geography and exports.
Specifically, using French firm-level data, Chaney finds two stylized facts to motivate his
theory. First, if a firm exports to more countries, then it is more likely to enter yet other
countries in the future. Second, where a firm exports today affects the locations to which
the firm will export in the future, since the firm will tend to export to places near its current
export destination. Here, “near” could mean either geographic proximity or larger trade
linkage. These facts prompted him to develop a model for trade networks.
The model Chaney provides features a discrete set of locations where distances between
locations can be defined. There is a search friction so that a firm needs to search for its
customers (could be other firms) via either a local search or a remote search. A search is
local when the firm searches from its own location, whereas a search is remote when it starts
from the firm’s existing customers’ locations. While the local search is similar to a random
attachment that forms a random graph, the remote search is similar to the preferential
attachment that is the basis of a scale-free network. As the model features both types
of searches, he shows that asymptotically the number of consumers (which is the measure
of firm size in that paper) exhibits a power-law tail. Note, however, that the number of
consumers is essentially the number of contacts/links, and does not map directly into sales
or employment, so there is a lack of intensive margin in this model. While the empirical
firm-size distribution is based on either sales or employment, whether or not considerations
of the intensive margin would distort the result is unresolved in Chaney (2014).
As discussed in Section 2.2, Chaney (2018) shows how the gravity equation can arise
from a combination of three conditions: (1) a power law in firm size, (2) the average squared
distance of exports following an increasing power function in firm size, and (3) a restriction
on the relative magnitude of the two power parameters. Chaney (2018) micro-founds the
first two conditions using a modified model of Chaney (2014), which does away with the
local search, and provides aggregate properties of trade (in addition to firm-level ones). He
shows that if Zipf’s law in firm size holds, then the distance elasticity of the gravity equation
will be one (ζ ≈ 1). Also note that the basis for both the power law in firm size and the
gravity equation in this framework is the preferential attachment in the network formation,
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and geography provides the link between the two. The model is appealing in that the
second condition is independent of particular geography, and hence the results are robust to
technological progress in transportation or changes in national borders.
3.2.2 Firm Hierarchy
Following the seminal “problem-solving” model of Garicano (2000) to explain the hierarchy
within a firm, related theoretical and empirical studies flourished. See, for example, Antra`s,
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Bloom et al.
(2014).6 The model features a “bottom” layer of production workers who own certain basic
skill/knowledge and engage in day-to-day production work. However, problems that are
beyond the knowledge of production workers arise from time to time, and the workers pass
these problems “up” to a layer of managers, whose time is used for problem solving. If there
are problems that are harder than what this layer of managers can solve, these problems
are then passed to the next higher layer of managers. This model generates a pyramidal
firm structure in which the higher the layer, the more capable the managers are in problem
solving. The pyramidal structure comes from the fact that harder problems do not occur
as often, and hence the number of managers in higher layers is smaller. If skill is defined
as the difficulty of the problem and if skill is costly to obtain, then the pyramidal structure
will be even more pronounced. Naturally, wages for higher layers of managers are higher.
One naturally wonders whether this kind of pyramidal structure would in any way become a
fractal structure7 so that power law in wages/income (also a well-known empirical regularity)
can be explained. Nevertheless, such a fractal structure approach to explain power laws using
a pyramidal firm hierarchy has not appeared yet.
Instead, Geerolf (2017) presents a modified version of the Garicano model with manager-
worker matching and explains both the power laws in firm size and wage/income using a
“power law change of variable close to the origin” technique that has been used in the physics
literature, e.g., Jan et al. (1999), Sornette (2002), Sornette (2006), and Newman (2005).8
Formally, suppose that two variables s and t have a reciprocal relationship, s = t−α (α > 0),
and s has a positive probability density around the origin, lims→0 f (s) = K > 0. Then, t
6Also see the survey article by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2015).
7A fractal structure is one in which the shape of the smaller parts of the structure resembles that of the
bigger one or the entire structure.
8The name of the technique is given by Sornette (2006, Section 14.2.1).
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exhibits a power law (in its right tail) as
g (t) =f (s (t))αt−α−1
g (t)
t−α−1
≈αK asymptotically.
That is, a power law (in the right tail) for t only requires that lims→0 f (s) = K > 0, but
otherwise f (s) can take on any functional form.
The setup of Geerolf (2017) assumes that the skills of agents are distributed on a contin-
uum [1−∆, 1], with ∆ ∈ [0, 1). Start with a two-layer firm hierarchy. There exists a cutoff
z ∈ (1−∆, 1) so that a type of manager y > z is matched with a type of worker x ≤ z.
The difficulty of a problem is distributed uniformly in [0, 1]. So, a worker of type x can
solve x fraction of the problems arising from the production process on his/her own, and
passes the 1−x fraction of the problems to his/her manager whose type is denoted as y. To
help the workers with the 1− x fraction of problems, the manager needs to spend h units of
time for each problem. With the labor endowment of the manager normalized to one, the
number of workers that a manager of type y can supervise (i.e., the span of control) is then
n (y) = 1
h(1−x) . In this worker-manager matching model, a manager represents a firm, and
because a firm with a manager of type y can solve y fraction of the problems, its output is
also y per production worker. Thus, the total output of this firm is y
h(1−x) . This model then
features an assortative matching so that a type 1 manager is matched with a type z worker,
and a type z manager is matched with a type 1−∆ worker.
As firm size is measured by the span of control, he shows that when ∆→ 0, a power law
in firm size emerges with a tail index of 2. For a quick intuition, first note that when ∆→ 0,
the support for skills [1 − ∆, 1] becomes infinitesimal, which means that the managers are
supervising very capable workers. But it does not really take much time to supervise these
workers, and hence the span of control becomes large. Formally, the 1− x term in the span
of control n (y) = 1
h(1−x) tends to zero and n (y) becomes arbitrarily large. Since the density
of 1 − x is uniform, the “power law change of variables close to the origin” can be applied,
and a power law emerges. In fact, the uniform assumption is stronger than necessary. As
mentioned above, all that is asked is that the density of 1 − x near zero be bounded away
from zero. Geerolf then generalizes his model to a setup with multiple layers L, where the
span of control of the top managers becomes a multiplication of the span of controls of the
lower layers. This implies a fatter tail than the two-layer case with a tail index of 1 + 1
L−1 .
Thus, when L→∞, Zipf’s law is obtained.
From the optimal choice of the matching process, w′ (y) = n (y), where w (.) denotes
the payoff function. This is because the difference in the payoff/income dw across different
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managers equals the additional output dy per worker multiplied by the number of workers
n (y). In the many-layer case, the income of a top-level manager xL ∈ [zL, 1] is given by
w (xL) = w (zL) +
∫ xL
zL
n (y) dy.
Since n (y) approximately follows Zipf’s law when L is large, the distribution of the top
income becomes a power law with a tail index of 2.
3.2.3 Innovation
Firm size is closely linked to productivity. For example, prominent firm-heterogeneity models
such as Melitz (2003) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) assume Pareto and Fre´chet productiv-
ity distributions, respectively, and both models entail a power law tail in firm size because
of these assumptions. A natural question is then why should the underlying heterogeneity
among firms be Pareto or Fre´chet distributed (or more specifically have a power law tail).
Chen, Hsu and Peng (2018) provide an explanation for both the power laws in productivity
and firm size in a rather standard general-equilibrium model of trade. Their model is the
same as that of Melitz (2003) except that an innovation stage is added so that productivity
is endogenously determined by the firm given its innate capability. The capability of a firm
is modeled as its probability of success in conducting R&D experiments. Since higher pro-
ductivity induces lower prices and larger sales, a more capable firm devotes more resources to
obtain higher productivity. This paper’s key finding is that power laws in both productivity
and firm size emerge under general underlying heterogeneity of firms. It only asks that there
be a sufficient mass of top firms, and hence it is functional-form free. The mathematical
mechanism is again the “power law change of variable close to the origin”. Moreover, the
power laws hold under very general asymmetric country settings.
Besides the underlying firm heterogeneity, this paper also generalizes the preference and
technological constraints compared with standard trade models. The power laws for both
productivity and firm size survive when the demand and innovation cost functions are both
regularly varying. For example, this includes CES and many non-CES and non-homothetic
preferences on the demand side, and general polynomial functions for the innovation cost.
3.3 Geography and Power Laws
While Chaney (2018) provides a unified framework to think about geography, trade, and
the power law phenomena, the role of geography is limited to providing a link between
the gravity equation and the power law in firm size. As power laws emerge from scale-
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Figure 1: A Central Place Hierarchy
free structures, such as scale-free growth processes (Kesten processes or Brownian motion),
scale-free networks, or more generally fractal structures, one wonders whether geography
itself can provide a fractal structure that forms the basis of a power law. In other words,
Chaney’s mechanism for generating the power laws is still based on preferential attachment
in network formation, rather than any geographic/spatial fractal structure. In particular,
could the power law in cities (a salient phenomenon in geography) be linked with the power
law in firm size in some way?
Hsu (2012) provides a theory that generates the power laws in both city size and firm
size. His model is a modern formalization of the original central place theory of Christaller
(1933) via a firm entry model with a continuum of goods. Central place theory describes
a hierarchy of cities and towns that emerge from homogeneous plains of farmers, who are
the base consumers for the goods and services that firms produce (while farmers focus on
agriculture). The two main properties of this theory are the hierarchy and central place
properties. The hierarchy property states that if a good of certain degree of scale economies
is produced at a location, then all goods with lower degrees of scale economies are also
produced in the same location. The central place property states that in a hierarchy of
cities, a next-layer city is located in the middle of the two neighboring larger-sized cities.
When both properties hold, such a hierarchy of cities is called a central place hierarchy. See
Figure 1 for a depiction of this hierarchy.
Central place theory was first developed as an abstraction of the pattern that Christaller
conceived as the hierarchy of cities and towns on the plain of Southern Germany. In the
modern-day economy, the so-called farmers can be broadly interpreted as those who are tied
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to extraction of natural resources and hence do not move. Also, the validity of central place
ideas does not depend on whether these “primary” industries represent a large or small share
of the economy. The theory works as long as there exist immobile people that spread over
the entire geographic space.
Even though central place theory has been a key building block of economic geography,
it has been praised for its deep economic insight but criticized for its lack of microfoundation
(see, e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999b). Attempts to provide microfoundation
include Eaton and Lipsey (1982), Quinzii and Thisse (1990), Fujita, Krugman and Mori
(1999a), Tabuchi and Thisse (2006), Tabuchi and Thisse (2011), Hsu (2012), Hsu, Holmes
and Morgan (2014), and de Palma et al. (2018). In particular, Hsu (2012) derives both
hierarchy and central place properties in the same framework. His unique contribution is to
provide an explanation for both power laws in city size and firm size by central place theory.9
The mechanism of the paper is explained in two steps as follows.
First, he explains how a central place hierarchy emerges. The model invokes a firm-entry
mechanism that is based on spatial price discrimination (Lederer and Hurter Jr., 1986). In
such a mechanism, firms deliver goods to different locations, and in each location, firms
engage in Bertrand competition. Thus, the resulting price is the second lowest “delivered
marginal cost” (unit cost of production and unit transport cost that increases with distance).
Such a competition mechanism implies that firms that enter and survive are equal distances
apart. Importantly, since goods differ in their degree of scale economies, the firms that
produce goods with higher degrees will be further apart in the geographic space because
they need larger market areas to survive. Such firms with larger market areas are also the
larger firms. Thus, the differences in the degrees of scale economies are translated into a
hierarchy of firms. With a small positive externality among firms (such as shared consumers
in the production location if workers are hired in that location), the hierarchy property
emerges because firms producing different goods tend to be located in the same place, and
those firms producing goods with higher degree of scale economies appear in fewer locations.
Because of the fact that competing firms are equal distances apart, a central place property
emerges when the hierarchy property is already in place.
Second, a central place hierarchy as seen in Figure 1 is already very similar to a fractal
structure except that the density of goods in terms of the degree of scale economies is left
open. Hsu (2012) shows that when the density function is regularly varying at the origin
(that is, only for goods with very small scale economies), then the power laws for both city
9Beckmann (1958) showed how power law in city size emerges from a fractal structure of population and
market area. However, his structure is assumed rather than derived. He did not explain the power law in
firm size, either.
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and firm sizes emerge. He shows that this condition is quite weak since it includes many
well-known and widely used distributions (See his Table C1). In other words, with this mild
condition, a central place hierarchy becomes a fractal structure, and the two power laws
follow. Even though the paper discusses more about cities, it is important to note that in
this model, the hierarchy of cities and the hierarchy of firms are exactly the same thing
except they are viewed from different angles.10 In particular, firm size and geography are
linked by the fact that larger firms serve larger market areas. This also echoes the empirical
and theoretical findings in Chaney (2018).
4 Concluding Remarks
This article reviews several power-law phenomena related to trade and geography. We first
review the theoretical literature on the gravity equation, and conclude that the power law in
firm size is a sufficient condition for the gravity equation to hold in a very large set of trade
models. These include all the ACR-class models with CES preferences as well as some trade
models with non-CES homothetic, directly-additive non-homothetic, and indirectly-additive
non-homothetic preferences where the distribution of firm productivity follows a power law.
The power law in aggregate trade is also shown by Arkolakis (2010) to be a good first-order
approximation, even if the firm-level trade elasticity is heterogeneous due to endogenous
choice of market access. Finally, Chaney (2018) identifies the model-free sufficient conditions
for generating the gravity equation and demonstrates that these conditions are empirically
plausible. Again, the power law in firm size is identified as a key condition. In contrast to
this seemingly universal applicability of the gravity equation, the literature has arrived at the
conclusion that welfare evaluation of gains from trade is not insensitive to the underlying
model structures. In particular, non-homothetic preferences and hence variable markups
will alter the simple ACR welfare formula. Thus, the ‘social physics’ does not extend to the
normative domain.
We also review several important theories of firm size distribution. The popular ex-
planation based on firm dynamics is discussed in detail, while static explanations that are
based on networks (Chaney, 2014, 2018), hierarchical structure of firms (Geerolf, 2017), and
innovation (Chen et al., 2018) are also reviewed. Whereas Chaney’s theory generates both
power laws in trade (gravity equation) and firm size, Geerolf (2017) explains both power
laws in firm size and income, and the model of Chen et al. (2018) generates both power laws
10Note that whereas Hsu (2012) provides a theory explaining power laws as an equilibrium phenomena,
Hsu et al. (2014) show how central place hierarchy and the power law in city size emerge as a socially optimal
outcome. Nevertheless, since there is no clear definition of firms in a social planner’s problem, this study is
silent about firm size distribution.
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in productivity and firm size. We would also like to highlight that the central place theory
in its modern form (Hsu, 2012) explains both power laws in city size and firm size by a
geographic fractal structure. These various theories advance understandings of the potential
mechanisms behind the various power-law phenomena. The common theme across these
theories is to deal with different aspects of agent heterogeneity in a neat way so that certain
scale-free properties can emerge without imposing strict functional-form restrictions on the
agent heterogeneity.
Recall that these power-law phenomena are important because: (1) they imply that
top firms have significant influence on the macroeconomic performance (consistent with the
granular economies phenomenon); and (2) related to the first point, the power law coefficients
are often tightly connected with welfare evaluation (as suggested by ACR and ACDR).
Further, the validity of these power laws forms a strong justification for making power-
function assumptions in economic models,11 which make complex and large-scale quantitative
analysis possible. The recent development of quantitative analysis in both international
and regional economics manifests this point (see, e.g., Costinot and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2015;
Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017, for surveys of these developments in the two respective
fields). With the aid of power-function assumptions, these quantitative analyses can often
accommodate arbitrary numbers of countries, industries, goods, firms and workers, etc, and
this high-dimensionality nature of quantitative analysis leads economists much closer to
effective and meaningful policy evaluation than ever.
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